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Abstract
We consider a group of Bayesian agents who each possess an independent private signal about
an unknown state of the world. We study the question of efficient learning: in which games
is private information efficiently disseminated among the agents? In particular, we explore the
notion of asymptotic learning, which is said to occur when agents learn the state of the world
with probability that approaches one as the number of agents tends to infinity.
We show that under general conditions asymptotic learning follows from agreement on pos-
terior actions or posterior beliefs, regardless of the information exchange dynamics.
Keywords: Bayesian learning, rational expectations, aggregation of information.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Following Aumann’s Agreement Theorem [1], the study of the exchange of information between
Bayesian agents has resulted in broad theoretical insight into the phenomenon of agreement and
the dynamics that lead to it. However, while questions regarding convergence to common posterior
beliefs or common posterior actions are now well understood, the correctness or optimality of these
beliefs/actions are understood only in special cases. We present general results showing “asymptotic
learning” for agents who are fully Bayesian, and iteratively act or communicate until they converge
to the same posterior belief/action.
We consider a group of Bayesian agents who have to make a choice between two alternative
actions. The agents are initially given informative, independent and identically distributed private
signals. They then participate in a general game or process, during which they learn from their
peers. We are not interested in the details of the dynamics of the game, but in what can be said
under the condition that at its conclusion the agents reach agreement. We consider two cases: in
the first they agree on posterior beliefs regarding the optimal action, i.e. the posterior probability
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that the first action is optimal. In the second they merely agree on which action is more likely to
be optimal.
For large groups of agents the combined private signals contain enough information to identify
the optimal action with probability approaching one. It is natural to ask whether the agents learn,
i.e., whether this information reaches the agents, or whether information cascades may emerge,
with arbitrarily large groups of agents who make the wrong decision with probability bounded
away from zero. We show that “asymptotic learning” occurs for a wide variety of models, so that
as the size of the group grows the agents learn the correct action with probability that approaches
one.
Regardless of the game the agents play, we show that if a group of agents participates in
any game or process which always results in agreement on posterior beliefs, then information is
aggregated efficiently and asymptotic learning holds. We further show that when private beliefs
are unbounded then agreement on actions is a sufficient condition for asymptotic learning.
Many studies describe Bayesian games or dynamics which always result in agreement, and to
which, therefore, these results apply. For example, consider a group of agents who are members of
a social network and iteratively reveal their true posterior beliefs to their neighbors. This dynamics
almost surely leads to common knowledge and therefore agreement on posterior beliefs, as shown
by Parikh and Krasucki [17]. Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [18] show that this still holds when the
agents are strategic with some discount factor, in any equilibrium. Simpler mechanisms also exist:
For example, McKelvey and Page [12] show that agreement on posterior beliefs can be achieved by
repeated public announcements of certain statistics of the beliefs. Our results apply and establish
learning in all these cases.
The synthesis of this work with that of Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [18] may be of particular
interest. They describe (among a number of models they consider) an iterative game involving
strategic Bayesian agents on a social network who are trying to estimate a binary state of the world
from initial private signals. They show that when the network is strongly connected then the result
is convergence to a common posterior belief, in any equilibrium. Our theorem applies to the game
they describe, for the case of a binary state of the world and conditionally independent private
signals.
Feigenbaum et al. [8] and Ostrovsky [16] show efficient aggregation of information in some
particular market games. Our results imply that when private signals are conditionally independent
then in any Bayesian market game in which there exist equilibrium prices - i.e., agents reach
agreement - these prices exactly reflect the information available to society.
1.2 General framework
We consider three models which share a common basis: There is a finite number of agents, with
S ∈ {0, 1} a binary state of the world which the agents are interested in knowing. Each of the two
possible states of the world occurs with probability one half.
The agents are initially provided with signals which are informative with respect to S and
independent, conditioned on S: There are two distributions, µ0 6= µ1, such that conditioned on
S the private signals are independent and distributed as µS. In Section 1.3.1 we slightly depart
from this framework by weakening the assumption on the private signals from being independent
to having zero correlation.
In all models the agents are assumed to be Bayesian and participate in some general game or
process involving the exchange of information. We are not interested in the actual dynamics, but
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only in the informational state at the conclusion of the process.
We define the action of an agent to be “1” if, at the conclusion of the process it considers
the probability of the event “S = 1” to be higher than one half, and “0” otherwise. Asymptotic
learning occurs when the probability that all the agents’ actions are equal to the true state of the
world S tends to one as the number of agents tends to infinity, for a fixed choice of private signal
distributions µ1 and µ0.
1.3 Common posterior beliefs
Aumann’s seminal Agreement Theorem [1] considers two agents who, following a general game or
process, have posterior beliefs regarding some event which are common knowledge. Regardless of
how this state was reached, the theorem states that their posterior beliefs must be equal.
Subsequent results by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [10] showed that two rational agents, who
repeatedly share their beliefs regarding the probability of some event, must converge to identical
opinions and cannot “agree to disagree”. This result was later extended to apply to a group of
agents connected by a social network by Parikh and Krasucki [17], and furthermore to strategic
agents by Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [18]. The spirit of these findings is that strategic Bayesian
agents who communicate their beliefs eventually reach agreement, under a very wide spectrum of
dynamics.
However, only a few results consider the value of the common posterior belief, and these apply to
particular games and signal distributions. In the case of independent Gaussian signals and myopic
agents on a social network, DeMarzo et al. [6] showed that information is optimally aggregated, in
the sense that the agents converge to the beliefs they would have if they had access to all the available
information. Furthermore, the Bayesian updates in this case are simple and converge rapidly, as
shown by DeMarzo et al. [6] and Mossel and Tamuz [15]. Other results showing optimal aggregation
are those of Feigenbaum et al. [8] and Ostrovsky [16], for very general signal distributions, but
specific models of dynamic market games.
The first question we study in this paper is the following: How effectively do agents who reach
agreement on beliefs aggregate their private information? Note that we follow Aumann [1] in
considering only the informational state at the conclusion of the game and disregarding the details
of the process.
The common posterior belief depends on all the private signals - the different pieces of informa-
tion that were initially available to the individuals - as well as the dynamics of the interaction. For
large enough groups, the information contained in all the private signals suffices to determine the
correct action, except with exponentially low probability (in the number of agents). Is it possible
that this information is not disseminated to the agents?
We show that it is impossible to reach agreement on posterior beliefs without learning a great
deal in the process: in fact, in this case information is optimally aggregated, in the sense that the
common posterior belief is the same as it would be if all agents observed all the private signals.
In particular, this means that “asymptotic learning” occurs: as the size of the group tends to
infinity the probability that the agents’ common action will equal the state of the world tends
(exponentially fast) to one, irrespective of the details of the game.
We note that while the assumption of independence is critical for this result, it is not imperative
that all the signals be identical; our proof of this theorem holds, as is, for the case that signals are
conditionally independent but not identical.
3
1.3.1 Uncorrelated private signals
The assumption of conditional independence of private signals may be too strong in certain settings.
However, when it is completely discarded then asymptotic learning may no longer be a consequence
of agreement, and in fact it may be the case that agents agree while learning nothing at all from
each other (see example 2.7 below). Hence it may be of interest to explore how this assumption
can be weakened while preserving asymptotic learning. Specifically, we consider the case that
private signals are conditionally uncorrelated1. For example, signals that are pairwise conditionally
independent (but perhaps otherwise dependent) are uncorrelated.
We show that in this case too, agreement implies asymptotic learning. In particular, we show
that if the agents agree on a posterior belief - and therefore on an action - then the action they
choose is optimal with probability that is inversely proportional to the number of agents n. We
show in Example 2.8 that this result is tight.
1.4 Common posterior actions
We here again consider a binary state of the world, conditionally i.i.d. private signals, and a general
information exchange process, as in Section 1.3. However, the agents in this case are not guaranteed
to learn each others’ posterior beliefs (i.e., posterior probabilities that S = 1), but rather their
posterior actions: recall that the action is “0” if the posterior probability of S = 1 is less than half
and “1” if this probability is greater than half. If this probability equals half then both actions are
optimal, and we don’t make any assumptions about how the agents break the tie. We therefore, in
fact, speak of common knowledge of an agent’s “optimal action set” L, which may equal {0}, {1}
or {0, 1}.
Common knowledge of actions is in general an insufficient condition for asymptotic learning.
Indeed, there are examples in which common knowledge of actions is achieved without asymptotic
learning, typically involving a small group of agents whose opinions dominate those of the remain-
ing agents. However, these examples do not include “highly opinionated” agents whose initial
private beliefs may come arbitrarily close to 0 or 1. Indeed, we show that under the condition
of “unbounded private beliefs”2 asymptotic learning occurs whenever there is common knowledge
of actions, regardless of the dynamics. That is, the agents’ common optimal action set L equals
{S} with probability that goes to one as the number of agents goes to infinity. This result shares
the flavor of other results (cf. Smith and Sørensen [20]) that rule out information cascades when
private beliefs are unbounded.
This result applies to many models in which, through varied dynamics, agents reach common
optimal action sets, for the case of the above described structure of private signals. These include
models studied by Me´nager [13], Sebenius and Geanakoplos [19] and one of the games studied
by Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [18]. In that game, under certain conditions, strategic agents
converge to the same action in any equilibrium. Thus this result shows that learning is efficient in
any equilibrium of their game, provided that private signals are conditionally independent.
Related questions have been studied in particular games. One line of work considers the case
1The precise condition for is that the log-likelihood ratio of private beliefs has zero covariance, conditioned on S.
We define this more formally in Definition 2.6 below.
2We define unbounded private beliefs in Definition 2.4 below. Essentially, private beliefs are unbounded when
private signals inspire beliefs that may be arbitrarily close to both zero and one. Note that in general there is no
requirement that beliefs are ever actually equal to zero or one.
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where each Bayesian agent acts only once, after observing the actions of a subset of the other agents.
In this case “information cascades” may emerge (cf. Banerjee [3], Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch [5]): There exist arbitrarily large groups of agents who take the wrong action with probability
bounded away from zero. Here too a condition for asymptotic learning (i.e., no information cascade)
is unbounded private beliefs, as Smith and Sørensen [20] show. Note that while their results are
similar in flavor (unbounded beliefs imply asymptotic learning), they study a particular game in
which, as they show, agreement on actions is reached, while we consider any such game.
A second line of work is the one explored by Ellison and Fudenberg [7] and Bala and Goyal [2],
who each study a particular non-Bayesian game involving social networks. The latter are also
interested in asymptotic learning (or “complete learning”, in their terms), and show some results
of asymptotic learning and some results of non-learning, depending on various parameters of their
model. Since their models are not Bayesian they are very different in nature, making it difficult to
draw comparisons between our results and theirs.
A paper by Minehart and Scotchmer [14] studies the same structure of the state of the world and
private signals. They consider a solution concept they call Rational Expectations Equilibrium, and
show that when it exists then agents agree on actions, and that when private signals are unbounded
then the agreed on action is correct with probability that approaches one as the number of agents
tend to infinity. Despite the superficial similarity, however, their model differs from ours in several
crucial aspects, and includes what is a strictly weaker result.
In their model posterior probabilities are factored in terms of the actions of the different players
(their Eq. 1). This would correspond to a situation where agents in equilibrium have no information
regarding the others’ private signals, except what is inferred from their posterior actions. Although
this setting is amenable to analysis, for a given distribution of private signals such an equilibrium
may not always exist, and indeed they note that typically this is the case (their Proposition 2). In
particular, their model does not describe general games or processes in which agents learn more
than the “final” posterior action. These include the games described by Rosenberg, Solan and
Vieille [18] and the model of Me´nager [13], to both of which our results do apply.
2 Formal definitions, results and examples
2.1 Definitions
Definition 2.1. Agents: We consider a finite set of n agents denoted by V .
Definition 2.2. State of the worlds and signals: We assume the state of the world is binary
S ∈ {0, 1} and that the distribution of S is uniform: P [S = 0] = P [S = 1] = 1/2.
Given a set of agents V as in Definition 2.1 and a state of the world S ∈ {0, 1}, we define
the private signals of the agents {Wu : u ∈ V } ∈ Ω
V as follows. When S = 1 (respectively,
S = 0) then the signals are distributed i.i.d. according to µ1 (respectively µ0), where µ1, µ0 are two
distributions over the same probability space (Ω,O). We assume throughout that the private signals
are informative, i.e., µ1 6= µ0.
We assume that the Radon-Nikodym derivative dµ1/dµ0 exists for all ω ∈ Ω. We denote by z
the log-likelihood ratio z(ω) = log dµ1dµ0
∣∣∣
ω
. We denote Zu = Z(Wu).
Definition 2.3. Private beliefs: the private belief Bu of agent u is the posterior probability of the
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event S = 1 given u’s private signal Wu:
Bu = P [S = 1|Wu] .
Definition 2.4. Bounded and unbounded private beliefs: In the framework of Definition 2.2 we say
that the agents have bounded private beliefs if there exists an ǫ > 0 such that P [ǫ ≤ Bu ≤ 1− ǫ] =
1.
Accordingly, private beliefs are unbounded from below when for every ǫ > 0 it holds that
P [Bu < ǫ] > 0, and unbounded from above when for every ǫ > 0 it holds that P [Bu > 1− ǫ] > 0.
Finally, unbounded private beliefs are such that are unbounded from both below and from
above.
Note that beliefs can be unbounded even though P [Bu = 0] = P [Bu = 1] = 0, i.e., beliefs are
unbounded even when can come arbitrarily close to {0, 1}, although these values may never actually
be realized.
Definition 2.5. Common knowledge of beliefs and actions: Consider a set of agents with private
signals, as defined in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2. The private signals may be bounded or unbounded.
Assume that furthermore each agent u has some additional information, and denote by Fu the
σ-algebra of what is known to agent u. We assume that Fu is a sub σ-algebra of σ(W1, . . . Wn), so
that each agent’s additional information is measurable in the aggregation of the private signals.
Let the posterior belief of agent u be given by Xu = P [S = 1|Fu].
Let the posterior optimal action set of agent u, Lu, be the set of actions that is more likely,
conditioned on Fu, to be equal to the state of the world.
Lu =


{0} Xu < 1/2
{1} Xu > 1/2
{0, 1} Xu = 1/2.
Common knowledge of beliefs is said to occur when Xu is almost surely Fw measurable for
all u,w ∈ V .
Common knowledge of actions is said to occur when Lu is almost surely Fw measurable for
all u,w ∈ V .
2.2 Common beliefs model
In this section we discuss the case of common knowledge of beliefs. Using the definitions above,
Aumann’s Agreement Theorem implies the following:
Theorem (Aumann). Let V be a set of agents with common knowledge of beliefs (Definition 2.5).
Then there exists a random variable X such that almost surely Xu = X for all u ∈ V .
It follows that there exists a common optimal action set L such that almost surely Lu = L for
all u. Note that the converse of this theorem is trivially true: if all beliefs are almost surely equal
then they are almost surely common knowledge.
Our main theorem for this section is the following.
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Theorem 1. Let V be a set of n agents with common knowledge of beliefs (Definition 2.5), so that
there exists a common posterior belief X such that almost surely X = Xu = P [S = 1|Fu] for all
u ∈ V . Then
X = P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn] .
The extension of this theorem to private signals that are not identically distributed (but still
conditionally independent) is straightforward; essentially the same proof applies.
2.2.1 Uncorrelated private signals
In this subsection we relax the conditional independence assumption on private signals, requiring
instead that private signals are conditionally uncorrelated. Recall that Zu =
dµ1
dµ0
(Wu).
Definition 2.6. Private signals are conditionally uncorrelated when Cov[Zu, Zv|S] = 0 for all
u, v ∈ V .
For example, when private signals are conditionally pairwise independent then they are uncor-
related.
Our main theorem here is the following.
Theorem 2. Let V be a set of n agents with common knowledge of beliefs (Definition 2.5), so that
there exists a common posterior belief X such that almost surely X = Xu = P [S = 1|Fu] for all
u ∈ V . Let private signals be uncorrelated conditioned on S, but perhaps otherwise conditionally
dependent.
Then there exists a constant D = D(µ0, µ1) depending only on µ1 and µ0 such that all agents
take the optimal action with probability at least 1− 4D/(n +D), where n is the number of agents:
P [L = {S}] ≥ 1−
4D
n+D
.
If we impose no conditions at all on the dependence structure of the private signals, then it may
be the case nothing at all may be learned, even when posteriors beliefs are common knowledge.
Consider the following well known example (e.g., [8]).
Example 2.7. Let the private signals be i.i.d. uniform bits (i.e., P [Wu = 1] = 1/2), and let S
equal the sum of the private signals, modulo 2.
Clearly agent u’s private belief P [S = 1|Wu] equals one half, regardless of Wu. Hence private
beliefs are common knowledge, without need for any communication. However, the agents’ action
will only equal S w.p. half, independent of the number of agents.
The following next example shows that the bound of Theorem 2 is asymptotically tight.
Example 2.8. Let V be the set of agents such that |V | = n and n is divisible by 4. Let S be
chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}. Let U be a subset of V , chosen uniformly at random, and
independent of S, from all the subsets of V of size 3n/4. Let Sˆ be an additional random variable
such that
Sˆ =
{
S w.p. p(n)
1− S w.p. 1− p(n),
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where Sˆ is independent of U and
p(n) =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1−
3
n− 1
.
The private signals are:
Wu =
{
Sˆ if u ∈ U
1− Sˆ otherwise
.
The communication protocol consists of all agents revealing their private signals to all other
agents.
Now, it is easy to verify that private signals are pairwise-independent, conditioned on S:
P [Wu = 1,Ww = 1|S] = P [Wu = 1|S]P [Ww = 1|S] ,
and so in particular private signals are uncorrelated and this example satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 2.
Note that
p(n) = 1−
3
4
·
1
n− 1
+O
(
1
n2
)
,
so that asymptotically the probability that Sˆ 6= S is inversely proportional to n. Since the private
signals are dependent on S only through Sˆ, it follows that even though the agents gain complete
knowledge of the private signals, they still may choose the wrong action with probability propor-
tional to 1/n.
Example 2.8 does not exclude the possibility that when signals are uncorrelated then information
is still optimally aggregated, although this optimum may only reveal S with probability inversely
proportional to the number of agents. This can be achieved by combining Examples 2.8 and 2.7.
Example 2.9. Let each agents’ private signal consist of two bits. The first bits of the agents are
picked as in Example 2.7, while the second bits are pick as in Example 2.8.
The communication protocol consists of all agents revealing their second bit to all other agents.
Here too the agents choose the action S with probability 1− 1/n. This is despite the fact that
optimal aggregation of information would result in them choosing S with probability 1.
2.3 Common actions model
In this section we discuss the case of common knowledge of actions, as defined above in Defini-
tion 2.5.
As shown in Sebenius and Geanakoplos [19] (for finitely supported private signals) and more
generally in Geanakoplos [9], common knowledge of optimal action sets implies that optimal actions
are identical.
Theorem (Geanakoplos). Consider a set of agents with common knowledge of actions (Defini-
tion 2.5). Then there exists an L such that almost surely Lu = L for all u ∈ V .
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The boundedness of beliefs (Definition 2.4) play an important role in the case of common
actions. When private beliefs are bounded then common knowledge of optimal action sets does not
imply asymptotic learning, as shown by the following example3. However, when private beliefs are
unbounded then asymptotic learning occurs, as we show below.
Example 2.10. Let there be n > 100 agents, and call the first hundred “the Senate”. The private
signal is a bit that is independently equal to S with probability 2/3. At stage one, each senator gains
knowledge of the private signals of all the other senators. At stage two, all agents gain knowledge
of this optimal action of the Senate.
It is easy to convince oneself that after stage one, all senators adopt the same action, which
depends only on their senatorial signals. Also, it is easy to see that after at stage two, by Bayes’
Law, the rest of the agents disregard their own private signals and adopt the Senate’s optimal
action set. Hence all the agents’ optimal action sets are common knowledge after this stage.
The probability that the Senate makes a mistake is strictly constant and does not depend on
the number of agents n. Hence the probability that the agents choose the wrong action does not
tend to zero as n tends to infinity, even though this action set is common knowledge.
We show that this cannot be the case when private beliefs are unbounded, in the following
theorem which is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Let V be a set of n agents with common knowledge of actions (Definition 2.5), so
that there exists a common posterior actions set L such that almost surely L = Lu for all u ∈ V .
Assume that beliefs unbounded from below (Definition 2.4).
Then there exists a sequence q(n) = q(n, µ0, µ1), depending only µ1 and µ0, such that q(n)→ 1
as n→∞, and when S = 0 then the agents take action “0” with probability at least q(n), where n
is the number of agents:
P [L = {0}|S = 0] ≥ q(n).
By the symmetry of the states of the world, an immediate consequence of this theorem is that
asymptotic learning occurs when L is common knowledge and private signals are unbounded in
both directions:
P [L = {S}] ≥ q(n)
for some q(n)→ 1, when private beliefs are unbounded.
3 Proofs
3.1 Common beliefs model
3.1.1 Preliminaries
We recall the details of the common beliefs model. S is binary state of the world picked uniformly
at random. The information available to each agent u, denoted by Fu, includes a private signal
3This example is reminiscent of Bala and Goyal’s [2] royal family graph.
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Wu, picked from either µ1 or µ0, depending on whether S = + or S = −. Agent u’s posterior belief
is Xu = P [S = 1|Fu], and its posterior action is Lu is given by
Lu =


{0} Xu < 1/2
{1} Xu > 1/2
{0, 1} Xu = 1/2.
Beliefs are common knowledge: Xw is Fu measurable for all w ∈ V . By Aumann’s Agreement
Theorem [1], there exists an X such that Xu = X for all u. Hence there also exists an L such that
Lu = L for all u.
Our main result for this model is the following.
Theorem. 1 Let V be a set of n agents with common knowledge of beliefs (Definition 2.5), so that
there exists a common posterior belief X such that almost surely X = Xu = P [S = 1|Fu] for all
u ∈ V . Then
X = P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn] .
Proof. Recall that Zu, agent u’s private log-likelihood ratio, is
Zu = log
dµ1
dµ0
∣∣∣
Wu
= log
P [S = 1|Wu]
P [S = 0|Wu]
.
Denote Z =
∑
u Zu. Then since the private signals are conditionally independent it follows by
Bayes’ rule that
P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn] = logit (Z) , (1)
where logit(z) = ez/(ez + e−z). Since
X = P [S = 1|X] = E [P [S = 1|X,W1, . . . ,Wn]|X]
then
X = E [logit(Z)|X] , (2)
since, given the private signals (W1, . . . ,Wn), further conditioning on X (which is a function of the
private signals) does not change the probability of the event S = 1.
Our goal is to show that X = P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn]. We will do this by showing that conditioned
on X, Z and logit(Z) are linearly independent. It will follow that conditioned on X, Z is constant,
so that Z = Z(X) and
X = P [S = 1|X] = P [S = 1|Z(X)] = P [S = 1|W1, . . . ,Wn] .
By the law of total expectation we have that
E [Zu · logit(Z)|X] = E [E [Zulogit(Z)|X,Zu]|X] .
Note that E [Zulogit(Z)|X,Zu] = ZuE [logit(Z)|X,Zu] and so we can write
E [Zu · logit(Z)|X] = E [ZuE [logit(Z)|X,Zu]|X] .
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Since Zu is Fu measurable, and since, by Eq. 2, X = E [logit(Z)|Fu] = E [logit(Z)|X], then X =
E [logit(Z)|X,Zu] and so it follows that
E [Zu · logit(Z)|X] = E [ZuX|X] = XE [Zu|X] = E [logit(Z)|X]E [ZuX |X] . (3)
where the last equality is another substitution of Eq. 2. Summing this equation (3) over u ∈ V we
get that
E [Z · logit(Z)|X] = E [logit(Z)|X]E [Z|X] . (4)
Now, since logit(Z) is a monotone function of Z, by Chebyshev’s sum inequality we have that
E [Z · logit(Z)|X] ≥ E [logit(Z)|X]E [Z|X] (5)
with equality only if Z (or, equivalently logit(Z)) is constant. Hence Z is constant conditioned on
X and the proof is concluded.
3.1.2 Uncorrelated private signals
We now turn to prove Theorem 2. We here relax the conditional independence condition on private
signals and replace it with the weaker condition of uncorrelated private signals (Definition 2.6).
When private signals are uncorrelated then Theorem 2 states that all the agents pick the correct
action L = {S} with high probability: P [L = {S}] ≥ 1 − 4Dn+D . The constant D here depends on
how informative the private signals are. We call it the noise to signal ratio of (µ1, µ0), and define
it as follows:
Definition 3.1. Let µ1, µ0 be two distributions on (Ω,O), such that the Radon-Nikodym derivative
z(ω) = dµ1dµ0
∣∣
ω
exists everywhere. Then the noise to signal ratio of the pair (µ1, µ0) is
D = 2
Varµ1Z +Varµ0Z
(DKL(µ1||µ0) +DKL(µ1||µ0))
2 . (6)
Where DKL(·||·) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence [11].
The reader may object that any of the four quantities involved in the definition of D may
diverge. We proceed with this section assuming this is not the case, and address this technical
point below in subsection 3.1.3.
Recall the definition Xu = P [S = 1|Fu]. Since S ∈ {0, 1}, this is equivalent to Xu = E [S|Fu],
which in turn makes Xu the minimum variance unbiased estimator (or MVUE, c.f. [4]) of S given
Fu:
Xu = argmin
M∈Fu, E[M ]=E[S]
Var [M − S] ,
Recalling that there exists a random variable X such that almost surely Xu = X we can likewise
write X = argminM∈Fu Var [M − S], for all u ∈ V .
We show that for large networks X is indeed a good estimator of S, in the following sense.
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Theorem 3.2. Consider the common beliefs model (Definition 2.5) with agent set V such that
|V | = n and with uncorrelated private signals (Definition 2.6). Then
Var [X − S] ≤
D
n+D
.
where the constant D = D(µ1, µ0) is the noise to signal ratio of (µ1, µ0).
Our main result for this model is an easy consequence of this theorem:
Theorem (2). Let V be a set of n agents with common knowledge of beliefs (Definition 2.5), so
that there exists a common posterior belief X such that almost surely X = Xu = P [S = 1|Fu] for
all u ∈ V . Let private signals be uncorrelated conditioned on S, but perhaps otherwise conditionally
dependent.
Then there exists a constant D = D(µ0, µ1) depending only on µ1 and µ0 such that all agents
take the optimal action with probability at least 1− 4D/(n +D), where n is the number of agents:
P [L = {S}] ≥ 1−
4D
n+D
.
Proof. Since X is the minimum variance unbiased estimator of S given Fu, it is in particular
unbiased: E [X] = E [S]. Hence we can strengthen the statement of Theorem 3.2, and in fact write
E
[
(X − S)2
]
≤
D
n+D
. (7)
By Markov’s inequality we have then that
P
[
|X − S| ≥ 12
]
≤
4D
n+D
.
Since Lu = {S} for all u whenever |X − S| <
1
2 then the theorem follows.
To prove Theorem 3.2 we shall need a few standard lemmas:
Lemma 3.3. If µ1 6= µ0 then Cov [S,Zu] > 0.
Proof. Let DKL(·||·) denote the Kullback-Leibler divergence [11]. Then
Cov [S,Zu] = E [SZu]− E [S]E [Zu]
= 14E [Zu|S = 1]−
1
4E [Zu|S = 0]
= 14
∫
log
dµ1
dµ0
(dµ1 − dµ0)
= 14 [DKL(µ1||µ0) +DKL(µ0||µ1)]
The lemma follows from the fact that KL-divergence is zero only for identical distributions and
positive otherwise.
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Since the private beliefs are identically distributed then Cov [S,Zu] is independent of u.
An equivalent statement to the lemma above is that E [Zu|S = 1] > E [Zu|S = 0]. Since the
private signals are uncorrelated conditioned on S, we expect that for large n their average will be
close to either E [Zu|S = 1] if S = 1 or E [Zu|S = 0] if S = 0. Hence we can expect that
Y =
1
n
∑
u
Zu − E [Zu|S = 0]
E [Zu|S = 1]− E [Zu|S = 0]
(8)
will be a good estimator for S. To prove our theorem we show in lemma 3.4 that this is indeed the
case. We will finish the proof by furthermore showing that the agents’ limiting estimator X is as
good as Y .
Lemma 3.4. Var [Y − S] = D4n , where D = D(µ1, µ0).
Proof. From the definition of Y it follows that E [Y ] = E [S]. Hence
Var [Y − S] = P [S = 1]E
[
(Y − S)2
∣∣S = 1]+ P [S = 0]E [(Y − S)2∣∣S = 0] .
By the definition of Y this means that
Var [Y − S] =
1
n2
·
Var [
∑
u Zu|S = 1] + Var [
∑
u Zu|S = 0]
2(E [Zu|S = 1]− E [Zu|S = 0])2
,
and since the private belief log-likelihood ratios Zu are uncorrelated conditioned on S, we have that
Var
[∑
u
Zu
∣∣∣∣∣S = s
]
=
∑
u
Var
[
Zu
∣∣S = s] = nVar [Zu|S = s]
so that
Var [Y − S] =
D
4n
,
where D = D(µ1, µ0) is the noise to signal ratio of Definition 3.1 above.
We would next like to bound the variance of Y . By the triangle inequality it follows from
lemma 3.4 above and from the fact that Var [S] = 1/4 that Var [Y ] ≤ 1/4 + O(
√
D/n). We show
that in fact Var [Y ] = 1/4 · (1 +D/n).
Lemma 3.5. Cov [S, Y ] = 1/4 and Var [Y ] = 14 ·
(
1 + Dn
)
.
Proof. We first note that
Cov [Zu, S] = E [ZuS]− E [S]E [Zu]
= 12E [Zu|S = 1]−
1
2
(
1
2E [Zu|S = 1] +
1
2E [Zu|S = 0]
)
= 14 (E [Zu|S = 1]− E [Zu|S = 0])
Since the different Zu’s are independent conditioned on S it follow from the definition of Y (Eq. 8)
that Cov [S, Y ] = 1/4. The claim Var [Y ] = 14 ·
(
1 + Dn
)
follows by substituting Var [Y − S] =
D/(4n), the result of lemma 3.4 above, into the identity Var [Y − S] = Var [S]+Var [Y ]−2Cov [S, Y ].
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2:
Proof. Recall that Zu is u’s private belief and as such is in Fu, as is X + bZu, for any b ∈ R.
Therefore, since X = Xu is the minimum variance unbiased estimator of S given Fu, for all b ∈ R
Var [X − S] ≤ Var [(X + bZu)− S] .
We therefore have that
∂Var [(X + bZu)− S]
∂b
∣∣∣
b=0
= 0, (9)
or that Cov [X,Zu] = Cov [S,Zu]. Since this is true for all u, by the bilinearity of covariance we
have that
Cov [X,Y ] = Cov [S, Y ] . (10)
Consider the set of zero expectation random variables measurable in our measure space which
have a second moment. This set is a real Hilbert space with Cov [·, ·] as its inner product. Hence
we can decompose (S − E [S]) (a zero expectation r.v.) to the following sum:
S − E [S] = α(Y − E [Y ]) +WS , (11)
with α ∈ R and 0 = Cov [Y − E [Y ],WS ] = Cov [Y,WS ]. It follows that
Cov [S, Y ] = Cov [αY +WS , Y ] = αVar [Y ] . (12)
We can likewise decompose
X − E [X] = β(Y − E [Y ]) +WX ,
with β ∈ R and Cov [Y,WX ] = 0. But since Cov [X,Y ] = Cov [S, Y ] (Eq. 10) it must be that in
fact β = α and we can write
X − E [X] = α(Y − E [Y ]) +WX . (13)
Since E [X] = E [S] we can subtract Eq. 11 from Eq. 13 and get X − S =WX −WS . We will show
that Var [X − S] is small by showing the both Var [WS ] and Var [WX ] are small.
Since Cov [Y,WS ] = 0 and also Cov [Y,WX ] = 0 we can take the variance of Eq. 11 and Eq. 13
to arrive at:
Var [S] = α2Var [Y ] + Var [WS]
Var [X] = α2Var [Y ] + Var [WX ] .
Now, by Eq. (12) we know that α = Cov [S, Y ] /Var [Y ], and lemma 3.5 states that Cov [S, Y ] =
1/4 and Var [Y ] = 14
(
1 + D4n
)
. Hence
α2Var [Y ] =
Cov [S, Y ]2
Var [Y ]
=
1
4
·
1
1 +D/n
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and so
Var [S] =
1
4
·
1
1 +D/n
+Var [WS ]
Var [X] =
1
4
·
1
1 +D/n
+Var [WX ] .
Now Var [S] = 1/4 and Var [X] ≤ 1/4, since X is bounded between 0 and 1. Hence
Var [WS ] =
1
4
·
D
n+D
Var [WX ] ≤
1
4
·
D
n+D
.
We have then that
Var [X − S] = Var [WS −WX ]
≤ 2(Var [WS] + Var [WX ])
≤
D
n+D
3.1.3 Note on private signals with infinite second moments
The proof of Theorem 3.2 above applies when Z has a second moment. We comment here on how
it may be extended to the case that the second moment of Zu diverges.
In this case the difficulty that arises is that D and Y are not well defined. To mend this we
substitute YMu for Zu in the definitions of Y (Eq. 8) and D (Eq. 6) and in the proofs that follow. We
fix M and take YMu to equal Zu when |Zu| < M and Y
M
u = 0 otherwise, choosing M large enough
so that YMu is an informative signal with respect to S; let µ1,M and µ0,M be the distributions of
YMu when S = 1 and S = 0, respectively. Then we choose M that enough so that µ1,M 6= µ0,M .
Now, YMu is bounded and therefore has both a first and a second moment, which our proof
requires. Furthermore, Yu is measurable by agent u; substituting it for Zu is tantamount to having
agent u ignore its private signal when it is too strong. The proofs of the lemmas and the theorem
remain valid, with a small variation to the definition of the noise to signal ratio D - Theorems 1
and 3.2 hold with D = D(µ1,M , µ0,M ), rather than D(µ1, µ0), which isn’t well defined in this case.
3.2 Common actions model
We recall the details of the common actions model (Definition 2.5). S is binary state of the world
picked uniformly at random. The information available to each agent u, denoted by Fu, includes a
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private signal Wu, picked from either µ1 or µ0, depending on whether S = + or S = −. Agent u’s
posterior belief is Xu = P [S = 1|Fu], and its posterior optimal action set is Lu is given by
Lu =


{0} Xu < 1/2
{1} Xu > 1/2
{0, 1} Xu = 1/2.
By virtue of it being a common actions model, Fu further includes Lw for all w ∈ V . By Geanako-
plos [9], there exists an L such that Lu = L for all u.
Definition 3.6. We denote by Bu the probability of S = 1 given agent u’s private signal:
Bu = P [S = 1|Wu] .
We consider here the case of unbounded beliefs (Definition 2.4), so that for any ǫ > 0 it holds
that P [Bu < ǫ] > 0 and P [Bu > 1− ǫ] > 0.
Our main result for this model is the following:
Theorem 3.7 (3). Let V be a set of n agents with common knowledge of actions (Definition 2.5),
so that there exists a common posterior actions set L such that almost surely L = Lu for all u ∈ V .
Assume that beliefs unbounded from below (Definition 2.4).
Then there exists a sequence q(n) = q(n, µ0, µ1), depending only µ1 and µ0, such that q(n)→ 1
as n→∞, and when S = 0 then the agents take action “0” with probability at least q(n), where n
is the number of agents:
P [L = {0}|S = 0] ≥ q(n).
This theorem follows trivially from the following theorem which we prove below:
Theorem 3.8. In the common actions model, fix µ1 and µ0. Consider a sequence of agent sets
{Vn}
∞
n=1, with |Vn| = n. Denote the common optimal action set of the agents in Vn by Ln. Then if
private signals are unbounded from below then
lim
n→∞
P [Ln = {0}|S = 0] = 1.
We shall need two standard lemmas to prove this theorem.
Lemma 3.9. P [S = 1|Bu] = Bu.
Proof. Since Bu is a function of Wu then
P [S = 1|Bu = bu] = E [P [S = 1|Wu]|Bu(Wu) = bu]
= E [Bu|Bu = bu]
= bu.
The two following corollary follows trivially from this lemma:
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Corollary 3.10. P [S = 0|Bu < ǫ] > 1− ǫ.
Lemma 3.11 is a version of Chebyshev’s inequality, quantifying the idea that the expectation of
a random variable Z, conditioned on some event A, cannot be much lower than its unconditional
expectation when A has high probability.
Lemma 3.11. Let Z be a real valued random variable with finite variance, and let A be an event.
Then
E [Z]−
√
Var [Z]
P [A]
≤ E [Z|A] ≤ E [Z] +
√
Var [Z]
P [A]
Proof. By Cauchy-Schwarz
|E [Z1 (A)]− E [Z]P [A] | = |E [(Z − E [Z]) · 1 (A)] | ≤
√
Var [Z]P [A].
Dividing by P [A] and noting that E [Z1 (A)] /P [A] = E [Z|A] we obtain the statement of the
lemma.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.8.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. For simplicity of notation we write “Ln = 0” rather than “Ln = {0}”, in
this proof.
We would like to show that limn→∞ P [Ln = 0|S = 0] = 1. For ease of notation we will denote
qn = P [Ln 6= 0|S = 0] and show that limn→∞ qn = 0.
Pick an arbitrary agent u. Recall that by definition Xu = P [S = 1|Fu]. By lemma 3.2 above
P [S = 1|Bu] = Bu, and so
E [Xu|Bu] = E [P [S = 1|Fu]|Bu] = P [S = 1|Bu] = Bu.
Applying Markov’s inequality to Xu we have that P
[
Xu ≥
1
2
∣∣Bu < ǫ] < 2ǫ, and in particular
P
[
Xu ≥
1
2 , S = 0
∣∣Bu < ǫ] < 2ǫ.
Since all agents have the same optimal action set Ln, the choice of u is immaterial and the
event “Xu ≥
1
2” is, by definition of Ln, the same event as “Ln 6= 0”. Hence
P [Ln 6= 0, S = 0|Bu < ǫ] < 2ǫ.
By application of Bayes’ Law we have that
P [Bu < ǫ|Ln 6= 0, S = 0] < 2ǫ
P [Bu < ǫ]
P [Ln 6= 0, S = 0]
.
Recalling our definition qn = P [Ln 6= 0|S = 0], we have that P [Ln 6= 0, S = 0] = P [S = 0] qn =
1
2qn
so that we can write
P [Bu < ǫ|Ln 6= 0, S = 0] < 4ǫ
P [Bu < ǫ]
qn
. (14)
If we denote
Kn =
1
n
∑
u∈V
1 (Bu < ǫ) (15)
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then by averaging Eq. 14 over all u ∈ V we get that
E [Kn|Ln 6= 0, S = 0] < 4ǫ
P [Bu < ǫ]
qn
. (16)
We thus bound E [Kn|Ln 6= 0, S = 0] from above. We will show that qn is small by also bounding
it from above.
Applying lemma 3.11 to Kn and the event “Ln 6= 0” (under the conditional measure S = 0),
this lemma yields that
E [Kn|Ln 6= 0, S = 0] ≥ E [Kn|S = 0]−
√
Var [Kn|S = 0]
qn
.
Since the agents’ private signals (and hence their private beliefs) are independent conditioned
on S = 0, Kn (conditioned on S) is the average of n i.i.d. variables. Hence Var [Kn|S = 0] =
n−1Var [1 (Bu < ǫ) |S = 0] and E [Kn|S = 0] = P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]. Thus we have that
E [Kn|Ln 6= 0, S = 0] ≥ P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]− n
−1/2
√
Var [1 (Bu < ǫ) |S = 0]
qn
. (17)
Joining this bound (Eq. 17) with the bound from Eq. 16, we get that
P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]− n
−1/2
√
Var [1 (Bu < ǫ) |S = 0]
qn
< 2ǫ
P [Bu < ǫ]
qn
or
qn <
2ǫP [Bu < ǫ] + n
−1/2
√
qnVar [1 (Bu < ǫ) |S = 0]
P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
. (18)
Here we used the theorem hypothesis that P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0] > 0, or that the signals are unbounded
from below.
Taking the limit n→∞ we get that
lim
n→∞
qn < 2ǫ
P [Bu < ǫ]
P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
,
which by application of Bayes’ law means that
lim
n→∞
qn <
ǫ
P [S = 0|Bu < ǫ]
,
and since by corollary 3.10 above we know that P [S = 0|Bu < ǫ] > 1− ǫ, then
lim
n→∞
qn <
ǫ
1− ǫ
.
Since this holds for all ǫ, we have shown that limn→∞ qn = 0.
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The proof above in fact implies a more quantitative bound for qn in terms of n and the private
belief distribution:
Corollary 3.12.
qn ≤ min
ǫ>0
max
{
2ǫ
1− ǫ
,
4
nP [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
}
. (19)
Proof. In Eq. 18 above, we consider two case, depending on which of the first or the second term
in the denominator of the r.h.s. is larger, and using the fact that a+ b ≤ 2max{a, b}.
In the case that 2ǫP [Bu < ǫ] is the larger term then the same derivation of the proof applies so
that
qn ≤ 2
ǫ
1− ǫ
.
In the second case we obtain
qn ≤
2n−1/2
√
qnVar [1 (Bu < ǫ) |S = 0]
P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
,
which by squaring and simplifying yields
qn ≤
4
n
·
Var [1 (Bu < ǫ) |S = 0]
P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
2 =
4
n
·
1− P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
≤
4
n
·
1
P [Bu < ǫ|S = 0]
.
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